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High school sports are routinely segregated based on the sex of the 
participants. 1 But forty years ago, the highest court in Massachusetts 
ruled in Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Asso­
ciation that the state constitution's newly-added equal rights amendment 
prohibited the blanket exclusion of boys from girls' athletic teams.2 In 
this way, state constitutional law in Massachusetts departs from Title IX, 
as well as that of other states, in providing a legal foundation for a wider 
selection of gender-integrated high school sports. Yet, while some mixed 
participation does occur on the margins, athletic opportunities in Massa­
chusetts do not significantly differ from those in other states, in that most 
remain segregated by sex. Sport organizers in Massachusetts have thus 
arguably missed an opportunity presented by its unique constitutional law 
to provide students in the Commonwealth a more balanced menu of ath­
letic opportunities that incorporate both sex-segregated and gender-free 
sports for the advantages each uniquely provides. As described more 
fully in Part III, gender-free sport can address logistical challenges posed 
by segregating boys' and girls' opportunities within the same sport, mit­
igate the stereotypes of inferior girls' sports, and maximize inclusion of 
transgender athletes. While segregated sport serves an important role as 
well-that of protecting and preserving opportunities for female athletes 
whose interests and abilities have historically and continuously been sup­
pressed-it is time to start thinking not about replacing girls' sports alto­
gether but adding more gender-free sports to the mix. Given its permis­
sive constitutional law on gender integration in sport, Massachusetts 
would be the perfect state to experiment with a more diverse menu of 
athletic offerings. At the very least, Massachusetts should identify those 
sports in which separation does more harm than good, and test whether 
degendering3 sport provides net advantages. Such experimentation would 
serve not only students in Massachusetts, but in other states as well. In­
deed, Massachusetts is unique in the degree to which it resists gender 
segregation in sport as a matter of constitutional law, but all states are 
permitted to favor integration more so than they are. Thus, the example 
that Massachusetts would set by embracing its unique constitutional law 
is capable of inspiring change throughout the country. 
See generally MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING ATHLETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR PRINCIPALS AND ATHLETIC DIRECTORS (June 2019), 
http://www. miaa. net/ genlmiaa _generated_ bin/documents/basic_ mod-
ule/MIAA _Hand boo kl9 _ 21. pdf [https: //perma. cc/6QBA-FZ34] [hereinafter MIAA HANDBOOK). 
2 393 N.E.2d 284, 296 (Mass. 1979). 
3 For the purposes ofthis article, the author uses the term "degendering" which relates to removing 
sex and gender as defining characteristics for separating and classifying sports programs. This term 
is written to be specific to this article, inclusive of non-binary people, and suggestive of co-ed athletic 
opportunities. This article also uses "gender-free" as shorthand for free from constraints or require­
ments based on the participants' sex or gender. Gender-free sports are distinguishable from coed 
sports, which do often take the participants' sex into account, whether it be by imposing a minimum 
or maximum number of participants of each sex, or otherwise factoring sex into the rules of play. 
For example, gender-free softball would not insist that batters alternate by sex, as is common in 
coed softball. Unlike mixed double tennis, gender-free tennis would not require that the server and 
receiver be of the same sex. 
l 
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Part I of this article describes the Supreme Judicial Court's decision 
in Attorney General v. MIAA and the influence of the state's equal rights 
amendment in its conclusion that boys cannot categorically be excluded 
from girls' teams. Part II explains the exceptionalism of Massachusetts 
constitutional law in the area of gender segregation in sport by comparing 
Attorney General v. MIAA to Title IX and other courts' interpretation of 
state constitutional law. Part III suggests that Massachusetts educators 
should take inspiration from the Supreme Judicial Court's skepticism of 
the protectionist rationale inherent in sex-segregation and create more 
gender-free athletic opportunities for high school students in the Com­
monwealth, which would serve to challenge negative stereotypes about 
female athleticism, equalize access to resources, and enhance opportuni­
ties for transgender students. Finally, Part IV applies the skepticism to 
the sport of golf in particular and nominates it as a candidate for degen­
dering. Degendering golf would create more opportunities for female 
golfers to shine against other golfers of all genders, as Emily Nash did 
in 2017 when she shot the lowest score at the Central Massachusetts Re­
gional Tournament for boys' golf. 4 It would also curtail the practice of 
relegating girls' team golf to the suboptimal spring season and provide 
more opportunities for students to participate in athletics without regard 
to gender. Finally, any adverse impact on girls' participation that could 
result from degendering golf could be mitigated by the fact that the rules 
of team golf are inherent or fixed. Compared to other sports, the scoring 
of team golf could be creatively reirnagined to reward and encourage 
participation by more diverse team of athletes who contribute different 
skills. 
I. 	 MAsSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON SEX­

SEGREGATION IN SPORT 

On November 2, 1976, voters in Massachusetts amended the dec­
laration of rights in the state's constitution, the oldest in the United States, 
to ensure that "equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
because of sex .... "5 The political motivation for this amendment came 
from the national movement to adopt an Equal Rights Amendment 
("ERA") to the U.S. Constitution, which Massachusetts had voted to rat­
ify four years earlier. 6 Though the national movement would ultimately 
4 Emily Kay, Dumb rule denies high school golfer Emily Nash her trophy because she's a girl, 
SBNATION (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www .sbnation.com/golf/2017 /10/26/16554750/emily-nash-mas­
sachusetts-high-school-golf-boys-tournament-denied-trophy [https: //perma. cc/TRM2-YRMC]. 
5 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. 106 ("Equality under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."). 
6 Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in 
Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1201 n. l (2005) 
4 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights [Vol. 25: 1 
fail, Massachusetts's ERA immediately curtailed various sex-based dis­
tinctions in such realms as child support,7 property ownership,8 and the 
criminalization of prostitution. 9 The subject of gender neutrality in public 
school athletics, however, proved to be more challenging. 
In 1977, a football-coach-turned legislator introduced a bill in the 
Massachusetts General Assembly's House of Representatives that would 
prohibit girls from participating in the contact sports of football, wres­
tling, and ice hockey. 10 The bill survived review by the education com­
mittee over the objection of one its members, Representative Ann C. 
Gannett. 11 But before the House could vote on the bill (which had been 
amended to drop reference to ice hockey), Representative Gannett con­
vinced the body to instead certify a question to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, seeking an advisory opinion on the bill's constitutionality under 
the state ERA. 12 Just over a month later, the Supreme Judicial Court 
opined that such a blanket prohibition on girls' participation in certain 
sports would be unconstitutional. 13 The Court had already concluded in 
earlier cases that the ERA requires the court to review sex-based classi­
fications by the state with strict scrutiny and accordingly found no com­
pelling state interest in a ban that would categorically prohibit girls from 
football and wrestling. 14 It also pointed out that courts routinely strike 
down policies excluding girls from boys' sports under the U.S. Consti­
tution's equal protection clause, which uses a lower level of scrutiny than 
the Massachusetts ERA requires. 15 As a result of the opinion, the legis­
lature dropped consideration of the bill. 
Meanwhile, the state's interscholastic athletic association, the Mas­
sachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association (MIAA), was struggling 
to conform its rules to the ERA as well. 16 Though the MIAA had long 
(explaining that Massachusetts was among the first fourteen states to enshrine equality of the sexes 
in their constitutions). 
7 Commonwealth. v. MacKenzie, 334 N.E.2d 613, 616--19 (1975). 
8 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 1 (1979) (permitting both spouses a unilateral right to convey 
property held as tenancy by the entirety). 
9 Commonwealth. v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 207 (Mass. 1977). 
10 An Act Relative to the Regulations for Participation in School Athletic Programs, House No. 
4078, 1977. 
11 Representative Gannett, a Republican from Wayland, was only the 35th woman ever elected to 
the General Assembly. See Massachusetts Women's Caucus, History of Women in Massachusetts 
Government (June 13, 2018), http://www. mawomenscaucus. com/history-of-women-in-massachu­
setts-government/; see, e.g., Letter from Ann. C. Gannett to President Gerald R Ford, (Sept. 9, 
1974), https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/exhibits/pardon/005601018-010.pdf (criticiz­
ing the decision of President Ford-a fellow Republican-to pardon Richard Nixon: "It sickens me 
to even think that this was the plan all along."). 
12 MASS. LEGISLATIVE RECORD (Nov. 21, 1977) House No. 6786 (statement of Rep. Gannett). 
13 Op. of the Justices to the H.R., 371 N.E.2d 426, 430 (Mass. 1977). 
14 Id. at 429-430. 
15 Id. 
16 Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 287 ("By 1976, evidently reflecting regu­
lations promulgated by the State Board of Education, and, more generally, the adoption of ERA in 
that year, [the MIAA Rules and Regulations Governing Athletics] had been amended so that a student 
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prohibited girls and boys from ever participating on the same teams, it 
amended this rule to permit both girls and boys to participate on teams 
designated for the other sex, unless the school provided a "separate but 
equal" team in that sport. 17 Consistent with the new rule, one Massachu­
setts high school permitted boys to play on its girls' softball team, given 
the absence of a separate softball team for boys. 18 This prompted protest 
and litigation, which effectively pressured the MIAA to amend the rule 
once again. 19 While retaining the right of girls to try out for boys' team 
in the absence of a girls' team in their sport, the new rule excluded boys 
from playing on all girls' teams. 20 When the MIAA denied waivers to 
Massachusetts high schools so that their male students could continue to 
play on girls' teams in a variety of sports, like volleyball, field hockey, 
and swimming, litigation against the MIAA again ensued, giving the Su­
preme Judicial Court another opportunity to apply the state's new ERA 
to high school athletics. 21 
In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Asso
ciation, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that it was unconstitutional 
to categorically ban boys from girls' teams. 22 Though the Court implicitly 
accepted the rule's apparent objectives-ensuring competitive fairness, 
promoting safety, and preserving athletic opportunities for girls-a com­
pelling justification was, and is today, not enough to survive the scrutiny 
of sex-based classifications that the ERA requires. 23 The state must also 
use narrowly-tailored means that inflict the least discrimination possi­
ble.24 MIAA's arguments in support of the rule, however, were "replete 
with stereotypical assumptions and generalities" about the weakness and 
fragility of female athletes. 25 While competitive fairness and safety are 
achieved by grouping athletes by functional ability, the Court reasoned, 
sex is an imperfect proxy for function, 26 even if "biological circum­
stances" confer a competitive advantage on boys in general. 27 The Court 
reasoned: 
The general male athletic superiority based on physical fea­
tures is challenged by the development in increasing numbers 
of female athletes whose abilities exceed those of most men, 
could not be barred from competing for a place on a team because of sex unless the school provided 









21 Id. at 288. 
22 Id. at 296. 
23 Id. at 291. 
24 Id. 
21 Id. at 294. 
26 Id. at 293. 
21 Id. 
6 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights [Vol. 25: 1 
and in some cases approach those of the most talented men. 
Coordination, concentration, strategic acumen, and technique 
or form (capabilities of both sexes) intermix with strength and 
speed (where males have some biologic advantages) to pro­
duce athletic results. Classification on strict grounds of sex, 
without reference to actual skill differentials in particular 
sports, would merely echo "archaic and overbroad generaliza­
tions. "28 
The MIAA' s final argument was that the rule was necessary to pro­
tect girls from being edged out of their own teams as they became 
"swamped" with male players. 29 But the Court was unwilling to credit 
the speculation that female athletes were categorically vulnerable to dis­
placement by more athletic boys. 30 Perhaps especially in female-dominant 
sports, the court reasoned that female athletes will generally hold on to 
their spots by virtue of their athletic talent. 31 The Court singled out gym­
nastics, swimming, and riflery as sports where it assumed boys were 
unlikely to have a competitive advantage. 32 Moreover, if permitting 
crossover tryouts for boys did in fact prove over time to reduce the num­
ber of athletic opportunities for girls, there are other less discriminatory 
means to address the problem. For example, the Court suggested the 
MIAA could cap the number of boys who could play on a girls' team or 
restrict participation to boys whose height, weight, and skill were within 
the range of their female competition. 33 The Court even suggested that 
"[a]drnission could perhaps be regulated by handicapping in a sport like 
golf. "34 Additionally, the Court emphasized that a separate boys team 
could always be a "backstop" to these alternatives: "if enough boys are 
interested in a sport to try out for, and threaten to oust girl players from 
a particular team, the school authorities are on notice that a boys' team 
may be in order. "35 
II. MAsSACHUSETfS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 
To understand the uniqueness of Massachusetts constitutional law 
on gender and sports, it is necessary to consider the legal context of sex­
segregated athletics, then and now. First, the Court's advisory opinion 
on crossover participation by girls is not revolutionary, but it's largely 
28 Id. (citation omitted). 





31 Id. at 294-95. 
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consistent with the mainstream of cases decided under federal and other 
states' constitutional law. 36 Neither is the fact that the Court offered no 
objection-not in its advisory opinion on the crossover participation 
rights of girls, nor in its decision in Attorney General v. MIAA securing 
a limited crossover participation right of boys-to the practice of segre­
gating athletes by sex in the first place.37 But the Court's decision in 
Attorney General v. MIAA, its refusal to engage in generalizations and 
stereotypes about inferior female athleticism, and its imagining of crea­
tive possibilities for integration provides a roadmap to some experimen­
tation with gender-free sport-an opportunity that the MIAA and its 
member schools have never pursued. 38 
A. "Separate but Equal" is the Default Rule in Sport 
Massachusetts is not unique in endorsing the default principle that 
athletics may permissibly be segregated by sex. 39 The pervasiveness and 
entrenchment of the separate-but-equal approach to sex equity in athletics 
is largely attributable to Title IX, the federal law passed in 1972 to pro­
hibit sex discrimination in education. 40 The statute itself is silent with 
regard to its application to collegiate and scholastic athletics, but its im­
plementing regulations,41 enforced by the Department of Education's Of­
fice for Civil Rights, supply additional detail. Though these regulations 
do not require educational institutions to offer separate male and female 
athletics programs, they do permit, and thereby and normalize, them. 42 
36 See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975) ("The WIAA rule forbidding 
qualified girls from playing on the high school football team in interscholastic competition cannot 
be used to deny the [appellants], and girls like them, the right to participate as members of that 
team."); Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1302 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing Minnesota 
high school rule that disallowed females from playing on male teams); Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic 
Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (holding that prohibition on females 
competing on male teams to be Equal Protection Clause violation). 
37 See, e.g., Yellow Springs Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic 
Ass'n., 647 F.2d 651, 657 (6th Cir. 1981) ("To hold that a recipient of federal ald may let girls at 
the middle school level compete on the same team with boys, if this furthers the goal of equal athletic 
opportunity, is not to hold that all teams must be coeducational at all levels .... "). 
38 Mass. Imerscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295. ("[T]he rule overlooks approaches .. 
. that could solve any anticipated problem of boys in substantial numbers displacing girls from 
competition.... Use of standards focusing on height, weight, or skill rather than solely on gender 
represents one such approach .... "). 
39 See discussion infra subparts II(B), Il(C). Courts outside of Massachusetts have justified per­
missible sex-segregated sports on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. 
Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) Gustifying ruling against female soccer players based on discretion of 
schools); Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) Gustifying 
exclusion of female from a high school boys' basketball team based on physical differences between 
the sexes). 
40 See 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (2012) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . "). 
41 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2018). 
42 Id. § 106.41(b) ("[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each 
sex .... "). 
8 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights [Vol. 25: 1 
Permission to operate sex- segregated athletics programs extends broadly 
to those teams for which "[the] selection ... is based upon competitive 
skill or the activity involved is a contact sport, "43 which is to say, any 
sport with a tryout process (including interscholastic and intercollegiate 
programs) as well as teams that are open to all-comers if the sport in 
question is a contact sport. 44 The regulations and associated policies nor­
malize sex-segregation by devoting the majority of their focus to the re­
quirements for equitable treatment of the separate programs45 and by lim­
iting the right of girls to play with boys and vice versa (so called 
"crossover participation") to a narrow range of circumstances, discussed 
in the next subpart. Title IX and its associated regulations and policies 
have tremendous effect on cultural norms, as well as institutional behav­
ior. 46 While prior to Title IX some educational institutions had experi­
mented with gender-free athletic opportunities, today nearly all interscho­
lastic or intercollegiate sports are designated male or female. In the 
1970s, some women's sports advocates argued for integrated athletic op­
portunities,47 a position that is rarely taken today. 
It is interesting that "separate-but-equal" justifications for gender 
and sport are accepted today, given that Title IX and equal protection 
doctrine apply formal equality mandates to other contexts, like admis­
sions and employment. The adoption and endurance of the separate-but­
equal justification reflect generalizations and stereotypes about female 
athleticism, to be sure. But it also reflects a pragmatic concern that sep­
arate opportunities for women and girls were necessary to overcome a 
history of women's exclusion from sport, and the resulting suppression 
of their athletic interests and abilities. 48 Even Massachusetts, with the 
broadest rights to crossover participation of any state, does not challenge 
the practice of segregating high school sports by sex as a general rule. 
In Attorney General v. MIAA, the Supreme Judicial Court at least implic­
itly acknowledged that preserving opportunities for previously under­
served girls is a compelling state interest. 49 This interest is served by the 
'separate but equal' approach but is only constitutional if it minimizes 
sex-based exclusions to the greatest extent possible. Thus, in ruling that 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. § 106 .41 ( c) ; 1979 Policy Interpretation; 1996 Clarification. 
46 Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Spon and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 18 (2001) ("In short, opportunities for female athletes are at an all-time 
high, and public interest in and support for women's sports has never been greater. The changes in 
women's sports participation have been accompanied by significant cultural change .... Title IX 
has played a large, if unquantifiable role in this cultural shift and the new opportunities that made it 
possible."). 
47 EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT 
EQUAL IN SPORTS 213-14 (2008). 
48 See generally DEBORAH BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S SPORTS 
REVOLUTION 15-39 (2010) (describing several justifications for separate-but-equal gender opportu­
nities in sports). 
49 See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295 (having discussed the criteria for 
sex-based classifications to survive judicial review, the court nonetheless felt the need to state that 
"the legality of separate but equal teams is not challenged here."). 
9 2019] Attorney General v. MIAA at Forty Years 
some crossover participation be allowed, the Court is not contradicting 
sex-segregated athletics, but is instead creating the conditions by which 
it is possible to uphold the practice as a general rule. 
B. Girls on Boys' Teams: A (Limited) Exception to the Rule 
Massachusetts is also not unique in endorsing the right of girls to 
try out for boys' teams.50 Title IX and equal protection doctrine both 
support at least a limited right of crossover participation by girls. Title 
IX's regulatory provision governing crossover participation mandates 
that an athlete be permitted to try out for a team of the other sex when 
the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the school already offers 
a team in that sport to members of the sex opposite to that of the athlete, 51 
(2) "opportunities in that athlete's sex have previously been limited, "52 
and (3) the sport in question is not a contact sport. 53 This statutory man­
date for permitting crossover participation has brought more athletic op­
portunities for females: though athletic opportunities for high school girls 
has increased more than 10-fold since the 1970s, the share of athletic 
opportunities allocated to girls has never been higher than 44.5 % . 54 It is 
likely that at nearly all coed high schools, girls' athletic opportunities 
have previously been limited, and even continue to be so. Therefore, a 
girl at a school with only a boys' golf team, for example, would have the 
same opportunity as boys to pursue a position on the team. 
Due to the regulatory exception for contact sports, however, that 
girl would not have a right under Title IX to try out for the school's only 
football team. 55 But courts applying the equal protection doctrine have 
been less willing to endorse the contact sports limitation, and have rec­
ognized the right of girls to try out for boys' teams in both contact and 
~See, e.g., Darrin, 540 P.2d at 893 ("The WIAA rule forbidding qualified girls from playing 
on the high school football team in interscholastic competition cannot be used to deny the [appel­
lants], and girls like them, the right to participate as members of that team."). 
51 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b) (2018). 
52 Id. Some have argued that the "historically limited" be interpreted to permit boys' right to a 
crossover tryout in sports where their opportunities are historically limited. See Gomes v. Rhode 
Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665-66 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 
733 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Adam S. Darowski, For Kenny Who Wanted to Play Women's Field 
Hockey, 12 Dmrn J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 153, 162 (2005). 
53 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018) (noting contact sports are defined in the regulations as "boxing, 
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of 
which involves bodily contact."). 
54 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF HIGH SCHOOLS, Participation Statistics 2016-17, 
http://www. nfhs. org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF /2016-17 _Participation_ Survey_ Results. pdf (not­
ing the percentage of athletic opportunities available to women in 2016-2017). 
55 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018) ("[A) recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for mem­
bers of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity in­
volved is a contact sport."). 
10 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights [Vol. 25: 1 
noncontact sports. 56 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opined 
that a rule banning girls from the contact sports of wrestling and football 
would never survive the strict scrutiny that Massachusetts applies to dis­
tinctions based on sex. 57 Similarly, courts applying intermediate scrutiny 
have rejected attempts to exclude girls from boys' teams based on gener­
alizations about inferior female athleticism and diminished size and 
strength on the grounds that those justifications are inconsistently ap­
plied. 58 
On the other hand, courts have found that equal protection doctrine 
mirrors Title IX' s restriction of female crossover participation to sports 
in which there is an available girls' team. For example, the Seventh Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that an exceptionally talented female basket­
ball player named Karen 0'Connor did not have a constitutional right to 
try out for a boys' basketball team because the school sponsored a sepa­
rate girls team in that sport.59 The court's decision, along with Justice 
Stevens's single-Justice opinion on appeal from a ruling involving pre­
liminary relief,6() confirmed that the law sublimated O'Connor's individ­
ual right to an opportunity suited to her talents to the broader interest in 
order to protect female athletic opportunities through the separate-but­
equal approach. 61 This distinction was necessary, as Justice Stevens put 
it, to address the "substantial risk that boys would dominate the girls' 
programs and deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscho­
lastic events. "62 This limitation is designed to protect the rights of female 
athletes as a group. 63 Women's separate athletic programs offer female 
56 See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (wrestling); Force v. 
Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (football). See also B. 
Glenn George, Fifty/Fifty: Ending Sex Segregation in School Spons, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1125 
(2002). The tendency of some courts to affirm female athletes' equal protection right to participate 
on boys' teams in contact sports (absent a girl team in that sport) neutralizes Title IX's contact sports 
exemption where state-sponsored athletic programs are concerned in those jurisdictions. See Su­
zanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Spons Exemption: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights 
Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381 (2000); George, supra at 1127 (pointing out that courts have not 
enjoined the contact sports exemption itself because it merely permits, not requires, conduct that 
violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
57 See supra Part I. 
58 Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1500 (noting that the state's rules do not require girls to lift 200 pounds 
to wrestle, while in some instances men must, though boys are not required to do so in this case). 
59 O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1981). 
00 See generally O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980). The Court of Appeals stayed 
the preliminary injunction that O'Connor had obtained from the district court. O'Connor petitioned 
the Supreme Court to vacate the stay, which Justice Stevens denied in his capacity as Circuit Justice. 
Id. at 1301. This decision remains the closest the Supreme Court has ever gotten to addressing the 
legality of sex segregation in athletics. 
61 O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1307; see also O'Connor, 645 F.2d at 581-82 (quoting Justice Stevens 
and making the same point). 
62 O'Connor, 449 U.S. at 1307. 
63 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(c) (2018) (stating the criteria for equal opportunity in terms of provi­
sions for "members of" groups, not individuals); Courtney W. Howland, Sex Discrimination and 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Putting Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L. J. 1254, 1265 (1979) ("The 
development of the woman athlete thus requires equality of participation in group athletics. Although 
equality on an individual basis might simply demand sex-blind sports teams, equality on a group 
basis demands more."). 
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athletes the opportunity to compete that they might not have if athletic 
opportunities were distributed solely on the basis of talent and interest, 
since the historic exclusion of girls and women from sport suppressed 
their interests and talents in athletics in the first place. This objective is 
arguably incompatible with strong protection for individual talented fe­
male athletes to engage in crossover participation, for two reasons. First, 
schools might be deterred from adding girls' teams in the first place if 
not for the fact that doing so creates a legal and socially acceptable way 
to prevent girls from trying out for boys' teams. Second, a broad right 
to crossover participation could undermine girls' sports by permitting the 
most talented girls to bypass rather than establish them as a legitimate 
purveyor of interest and talent. 
In Massachusetts as well, girls' right to part1c1pation on boys' 
teams-as well as the reciprocal right of boys, discussed below-is lim­
ited to those athletes for whom the school does not provide a team in that 
sport to members of the athlete's sex. 64 Courts in Massachusetts have 
never had the opportunity to address the compatibility of this limitation 
with the state ERA. 
C. Boys on Girls' Teams: Almost Never 
Massachusetts law is unique in recognizing a right of boys to try 
out for girls' teams. 65 Until recently, the MIAA rule implementing the 
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Attorney General v. MIAA read, "A 
girl may play on a boys' team if that sport is not offered in the school for 
the girl, and a boy may play on a girls' team if that sport is not offered 
in the school for the boy. "66 Recent revisions to the MIAA handbook 
confirmed that this right can be limited in situations where necessary to 
preserve opportunities for girls in the interest of Title IX compliance67 ­
a clarification likely responsive to pressure resulting from complaints to 
the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (hereafter 
"OCR")68 that the application of MIAA's rule permitting boys on girls' 
64 MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 42. Rule 43.2 and 43.3 of the MIAA's Rules and Regula­
tions Governing Athletes state: 
43.2.If a school offers a single team in a particular sport, it may not restrict eligibility based on 
gender unless such a restriction is necessary to ensure that the school's gendered designation of 
athletic opportunities complies with Title IX (either by demonstrating proportionality or the absence 
of unmet interest among members of the underrepresented sex). 
43.3.If a school offers a girls' team and a boys' team in a particular sport (including offering the 
same sport in two different seasons), it may restrict eligibility based on gender. 
Id. The language permitting schools to exclude boys from girls' teams if necessary for Title IX 
compliance went into effect in 2019. Id. at 4. 
65 Id. at 4, 42. 
66 Id. at 4. 
67 Id. at 4, 42. 
68 Bob Holmes, MIAA receives complaint over boys playing field hockey, Bos. GLOBE (Sept. 28, 
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field hockey teams deprives girls of opportunities in violation of Title IX. 
Considering the three alternative routes that schools may take to demon­
strate compliance in their distribution of athletic opportunities by sex, a 
school would only be permitted to exclude a boy from the only team in 
the sport if (1) girls are underrepresented in athletic opportunities (viola­
tion of the first test), (2) there is no history and continuing practice of 
adding opportunities for girls (violation of the second test), and (3) the 
presence of a boy on the team displaces a girl from the team who other­
wise would have qualified for the team (and therefore constitutes "unmet 
interest" in violation of the third compliance test). 69 At schools where the 
first or second tests are satisfied, or where the team in question does not 
cut players, boys still have the right to try out for girls' teams. 70 
Even with the recent qualification for Title IX compliance, boys' 
rights to participate on girls' teams in sports for which no boys' teams 
exist is still broader than under Title IX. Title IX, in contrast, limits 
crossover participation to athletes for whom athletic opportunities have 
"previously been limited .... "71 Though commentators have discussed 
a sport-specific interpretation of this requirement that would give boys 
an opportunity to try out for sports that have been historically limited to 
girls,72 only one federal court has ever endorsed this position, in a pre­
liminary injunction analysis that was later vacated as moot. 73 Instead, the 
prevailing view seems to be that the regulation requires the participants' 
athletic opportunities in general to have been historically limited at the 
participants' schools. 74 As noted above, this interpretation will rarely if 
ever apply to boys. Even if a boy did successfully manage to mount this 
hurdle, he would still only have the right to participate in non-contact 
sports in which his school did not sponsor a boys' team. 
Boys outside of Massachusetts have also had relatively little success 
using equal protection doctrine to secure their right to play on girls' 
teams. 75 Courts applying intermediate scrutiny required by the 
2012), https://www.boston.com/sports/untagged/2012/09/28/miaa-receives-us-complaint-over­
boys-playing-field-hockey [https://perma.cc/2Z33-WDAT]; see also Christopher Marquis, An 
Equal Playing Field: The Potential Conflict Between Title IX & the Massachusetts Equal Rights 
Amendment, 34 B.C.J.L. & Soc. JUST. 77, 79 (2014) (describing the complaint issued by the Office 
of Civil Rights to the MIAA). 
(f) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercol­
legiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
70 Id. 
71 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b) (2018). 
72 Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D.R. I. 1991); Da­
rowski, supra note 52, at 162-65; Sangree, supra note 56, at 390 ("However, with respect to all­
female teams, the majority of courts have declined to order that males be allowed to try out because 
they cannot establish a history of exclusion from sports opportunities."). 
73 Gomes, 469 F. Supp. at 664-66. 
74 Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993); Mularadelis v. 
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 74 A.D.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
75 Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1982); Kleczek v. R.I. 
Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D.R.I. 1991); B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., Cumberland 
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Fourteenth Amendment have generally reasoned that redressing past dis­
crimination against girls is an important objective and that the categorical 
exclusion of boys from girls' teams suitably serves this objective by pro­
tecting existing opportunities from displacement by more athletic boys. 76 
Courts considering state constitutional claims have reached similar con­
clusions,77 even in states that, like Massachusetts, apply strict scrutiny of 
sex-based designations. 78 Thus, the rights of girls as a group to have sep­
arate athletic opportunities is elevated above both the rights of individual 
girls who may be better served by the boys' team and of individual boys 
to play sports only offered to girls. 79 
However, there is one notable exception of a recent decision apply­
ing equal protection principles in boys' favor. In March 2019, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a preliminary injunction against the 
Minnesota state interscholastic athletic association's rule that prohibited 
boys from participating on competitive dance teams. 80 The court reasoned 
that the plaintiffs had a likelihood of success on the merits because 
statewide participation data showed very similar rates of athletic partici­
pation by boys and girls, 81 calling into question the persuasiveness of the 
association's justification for treating students differently on the basis of 
sex. 82 Subsequent to the decision, the association changed the rule after 
settling the case, 83 though it is still too soon to tell whether this case is an 
outlier rooted in potentially unique facts of Minnesota's equitable partic­
ipation data or the beginning of a shift in favor of integrating former 
girls' sports. 
Unless or until such shift occurs, the Supreme Judicial Court's 
Reg'! Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1066 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (addressing only state 
claims, as it is not a federal court); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1979) (citing People v. Ellis, 311N.E.2d98 (Ill. 1974)). 
76 Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56. 
77 Klezcek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56; B.C. v. Bd. ofEduc., 531 A.2d at 1065-66 (addressing only 
state claims, as it is not a federal court). 
78 Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 858-59 (citing People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (lll. 1974)). 
79 Parenthetically, one issue that seems to be underexamined by all courts considering equal pro­
tection or Title IX claims by boys is that the concern about boys swamping girls' teams has an outer 
limit in Title IX. Even if boys did in fact displace girls from opportunities that they had previously 
enjoyed, Title IX would operate in many such cases to require schools to replace those opportunities 
since an equitable distribution of athletic opportunities is still required in those circumstances. A 
school whose girls' volleyball team has been displaced by boys, for example, would be legally 
compelled to add another girls' volleyball team to ensure that the overall distribution of athletic 
opportunities remains proportionate to the gender breakdown of the student body. That school might 
also need to eliminate a boys' team as well to attain proportionality, since the original girls' volley­
ball team itself probably existed to balance out some other boys' team. But the result might be 
athletic opportunities more aligned with the actual interest of boys who just (in this hypothetical) 
wanted to play volleyball so badly that they took over the girls' team. 
m D.M. v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917 F.3d 994, 1004 (8th Cir. 2019). 
81 ld. at 1001 (stating that data for 2017-18 showed boys were actually the underrepresented sex 
by 0.35 percentage points). 
82 ld. at 1002. 
83 Settlement Allows Minnesota Buys to Dance Competitively, AP NEWS (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www .apnews.corn/ff8c2ld045aa4ec18996321021ef7laf [https://perma.cc/ZQP5-9QS4]. 
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ruling in Attorney General v. MIAA that the state athletic association's 
rule banning boys from girls' teams violated the state constitution's Equal 
Rights Amendment remains unique. Other courts assume that recogniz­
ing boys' rights to crossover participation would threaten girls' opportu­
nities because girls would not be able to hold on to them in an open 
tryout. 84 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pushes back against 
this narrative with concern for the generalization it embodies. 85 
In acknowledging the potential for girls to hold to their own against 
boys, or at least its rejection that the concern of protecting girls' oppor­
tunities requires such a blunt tool as boys' categorical exclusion, the Su­
preme Judicial Court did more than acknowledge the legal right of a 
handful of boys who are so devoted to sports like field hockey, volley­
ball, or swimming, that they are willing to try out for a girls' team. Its 
pushback against the protectionism rationale for segregation also pro­
vides legal support for athletic opportunities that are organized without 
regard to athletes' gender, especially where such gender-free opportuni­
ties are included in a menu of diverse athletic offerings, some of which 
are segregated and some of which are not. While it invited consideration 
of other integration techniques like height- weight- and skill-based clas­
sifications, or gender-neutral systems of "handicapping, "86 the Supreme 
Judicial Court also acknowledged that some sports might be more suita­
ble for integration than others. 87 Yet the MIAA' s response to the Su­
preme Judicial Court's decision was to remove the blanket restriction on 
boys' participation on girls' teams, allowing students of either sex to try 
out for the cross-sex team if that is the only team in their sport. 88 It has 
never seriously accepted the Supreme Judicial Court's invitation or 
roadmap for progressing beyond minimal compliance with its decision 
and imagining more integrated possibilities for high school sports. 
84 See Williams, 998 F.2d at 172-76. 
85 Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 290 ("[E]ven if equal rights provisions 
could be viewed primarily as a means of eradicating discrimination against women, they tend to 
protect men as well, because disadvantages suffered by males are often premised on a "romantic 
paternalism" stigmatizing to women."). 
86 Id. at 295. 
87 Id. at 295 ("The defendants offer ... a connection between the presence of male athletes on a 
team with injury to females. It is replete with stereotypical assumptions and generalities .... But if 
we were to indulge an assumption of such a relationship in the rougher sports, what of golf, gym­
nastics, riflery, skiing, track, cross-country running, swimming, tennis? Risks are not constant." 
(Citations omitted)). 
88 MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 42. Rule 43.1 of the MIAA's Rules and Regulations Gov­
erning Athletes states: 
No student shall be denied in any implied or explicit manner the opportunity to participate in any 
interscholastic activity because of gender. A school may establish separate teams for males and 
females for interscholastic competition in a sport provided that both teams receive equal instruction, 
training, coaching, access to available facilities, equipment, opportunities to practice and compete. 
Id. 
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III. BENEFITS OF GENDER-FREE ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION 
Despite the Attorney General v. MIAA court's refusal to accept the 
categorization of all girls as athletically inferior, Massachusetts still or­
ganizes sports with protectionism in mind. 89 Few boys participate on 
girls' teams in team sports that have traditionally been female; field 
hockey is the notable example.90 And when boys participate in girls' 
teams in individual sports, they have in the past been subject to a rule (as 
were girls who play on boys' teams) that redirects them into post-season 
tournaments that correspond to their own sex. 91 
While retaining segregated opportunities in many or even most 
sports probably makes sense, it is notable that even with the state consti­
tution's more permissive approach to boys and girls playing together, 
there have been few-if any-efforts to combine once-segregated oppor­
tunities for girls and boys into sports organized without regard to gender. 
Instead, opportunities for gender-free participation are as rare in Massa­
chusetts as in any other state notwithstanding the benefits to students that 
would come from having at least some gender-free opportunities to 
choose from. This is a missed opportunity to pursue the benefits of gen­
der-free participation. In particular, as addressed in this part, those ben­
efits are: reducing stigma, ensuring equal treatment, and maximizing in­
clusion of transgender athletes. 
A. Segregation and Stigma 
Segregation stigmatizes women's sports and its participants by per­
petuating the belief that female athletes require that a remedial vt!rsion of 
sport must exist to accommodate them. But of course, it is possible for 
female athletes to be competitive and successful when they compete with 
and against male athletes. For example, in October 2017, a female golfer 
named Emily Nash-mentioned in the introduction of this Article-shot 
the lowest score at the Central Massachusetts boys' regional champion­
ship.92 Yet, public perception of Nash's talent would have been different 
89 See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 288. 
90 Marquis, supra note 68, at 85 (describing field hockey examples). 
91 See MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
ATHLETICS A HANDBOOK FOR PRINCIPALS AND ATHLETIC DIRECTORS 42 (revised Oct. 3, 2018), 
http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa _generated_ bin/documents/basic_ module/MIAAHandbookl719.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AMG8-47SZ] [hereinafter MIAA HANDBOOK 2017-2019]. Rule 43.2.1.2 of the 
MIAA's former Rules and Regulations Governing Athletes states: 
Students from mixed gender regular season teams will participate in the regional and state tour­
naments of their own gender in the sports of cross country, indoor track, outdoor track, skiing, 
swimming and diving, and individual tennis. 
Id. 
92 Kay, supra note 4. 
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if her high school had made the choice to sponsor a girls team. If it had, 
she would have competed in the girls' regular season and the girls' post­
season tournament in the spring, where her victory (if she had won) 
would have been unremarkable. Individual examples like Nash are con­
sistent with evidence of the tendency for women to outperform men in 
certain sports, and that they are closing the performance gap in others. 93 
In a world with more opportunities for gender-free sport, it will be easier 
to recognize female athleticism as just plain athleticism. 
Not only would integration of sports provide more opportunities to 
contextualize female athleticism, it is also possible that it would permit 
exploration of the possibility that segregation itself is contributing to 
differences in performance by perpetuating self-fulfilling gender stereo­
types. Segregation sends the message that "women are physically 
weaker" or that they "will be badly beaten and emotionally crushed" if 
they participate alongside men. 94 These stereotypes themselves may af­
fect the athletic performance of female athletes who internalize them. 
Indeed, sport scholars have shown that the concept of stereotype inter­
nalization operates in the context of athletics. 95 
Some coed athletic opportunities continue to perpetuate perfor­
mance-affecting stereotypes with protectionist, sex-specific rules. For ex­
ample, some coed sports have rules that take the sex of the player into 
account, whether by setting a minimum number of female players that 
can be on the field or imposing other sex-specific rules. 96 In high school 
sports, a common example of coed sports is mixed double tennis, which 
requires that participating teams consist of one female and one male 
player. 'Tl In similar fashion, some high school athletic associations en­
dorse coed golf that is played by pairs consisting of one male and one 
93 MCDONAGH & PAPPANO, supra note 47, at 58-63. 
94 Id. at 15; see also Suzanne Eckes & Stephanie D. McCall, Channeling Billy Elliott: Legal 
Issues and Outmoded Stereotypes in Athletics, 366 ED. LAW REP. 578, 583 (2019) (arguing that the 
challenge to integrate Minnesota high school dance teams "could have been figured as a site for 
insisting on girls' strengths and boys would be 'allowed' to dance with them" but instead served to 
"us[e] sports to construct essentialized beliefs about gender differences."). 
95 One study noted that "there are two main pathways in which sex stereotypes manifest in sporting 
contexts. First, as long as it is known by the individual, a stereotype can operate directly and affect 
his/her performance if it is activated in a valued situation. Stereotypes can also operate indirectly, 
through an internalization process." Julie Boich ... et al., Development of Sex Stereotypes Relative 
to Sport Competence and Value During Adolescence, 15 PSYCHOL. OF SPORT & EXERCISE 212, 212 
(2014) (citations omitted). 
96 See Adam Cohen et al., Investigating a Coed Sport's Ability to Encourage Inclusion and Equal­
ity, 28 J. SPORT MGMT. 220 (2014) (noting such examples of coed football rules that require a female 
player to catch or pass the ball once every four downs, and coed softball rules that allow a male 
batter to take two bases instead of one if he is walked on four pitches); see also Catherine LeClair, 
Why Co-Ed Sports Leagues Are Never Really Co-Ed, DEADSPIN (July 25, 2018), https://dead­
spin. com/why-co-ed-sports-leagues-are-never-really-co-ed-1827699592 [https: / /perma. cc/DE3L­
DJQ8]. 
97 MIAA, Individual Tennis Format Sport Specific Information at 3, available at 
http://www.miaa.net/ gen/miaa _generated_ bin/documents/basic_ module/tennisindividual20 l 9for­
mat.pdf [https: //perma.cc/G2N3-FfX8]. 
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female player. 98 While coed sports structured this way avoid some of the 
ways that segregation replicates stereotypes (like the unequal resources 
problem discussed above), they still send the message that a team with 
more females than another team is inherently disadvantaged. Other coed 
sports have sex-specific rules that reinforce the assumption that female 
players can't hold their own on the field, such as coed a flag football rule 
that a female must catch or pass the ball every four downs, or coed soft­
ball that requires the batter order to alternate by sex and that penalizes a 
team that walks a male batter by letting him take two bases instead of the 
traditional one (the assumption being that the next female in the batting 
order is more easily struck out).99 Additionally, some coed sports (soft­
ball, for example) are structured in ways that marginalize female players 
into the less critical positions and allow male athletes to usurp them (such 
as rules forbidding outfielders from coming in too close when females 
are at bat). 100 
Gender-free sport reduces the role of stereotype threat by validating 
female athleticism from the start. Removing segregation signals confi­
dence in the ability of female athletes to hold their own, both by convey­
ing the attitude that girls do not need to be protected from boys, and by 
dismantling girls-sport-specific rules that convey the message that female 
athletes are inferior, such as rules that allow shorter courses of play for 
females in golf, 101 and "different rules for checking, hitting, and other 
movements" for women's hockey teams. 102 The opportunity for boys and 
girls to compete together can give boys the opportunity to appreciate and 
respect girls' abilities. 103 Sport scholars have applied intergroup contact 
theory to athletic participation and found evidence that diversity among 
teams breaks down stereotypes about race, sexual orientation, and even 
sex. 104 In the sports that inspire lifelong participation, integration could 
have positive ramifications for gender equality far beyond high school 
athletics. For example, recreational golf is an important social lubricant 
for professional relationships that can serve as a source of business, men­
toring, referrals, and information. 105 Country clubs where recreational 
golf is played have historically excluded women as a result of its 
98 See, e.g., Coed Golf Regulations, IOWA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC UNION (May 22, 
2018), https://ighsau.org/news/co-ed-golf-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/W2JM-WVN3]. 
99 Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 222. 
loo Id. 
io1 Id. 
102 Nancy Leong, Against Women's Sports, 95 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1275-76 (2018) (describ­
ing how the different rules for men's and women's sports perpetuate the stereotype of inferior female 
athleticism as well as other gender stereotypes). 
103 Michael A. Messner & Nancy M. Solomon, Social Justice and Men's Interests: The Case of 
Title IX, 31 J. OF SPORT AND Soc. ISSUES 162, 177 (2007). 
104 Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 223-224, 232 (describing applications of contact theory to 
sport); Id. at 232 (finding that the gender-free sport of quidditch promoted positive stereotypes about 
female athleticism). 
1~ MARCIA CHAMBERS, THE UNPLAYABLE LIE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WOMEN AND 
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN GOLF 5 (1995). 
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emphasis on male corporate culture. 106 And while such policies are rare 
today, pervasive negative stereotypes about female golfers still under­
mine their opportunities to participate. 107 Men whose high school team­
mates were female will be less likely to support and perpetuate these 
formal and informal barriers. 108 They will be less likely to assume that a 
female colleague doesn't golf or doesn't golf well, and thus more inclined 
to extend an invitation to participate, thereby increasing her opportunities 
to cultivate relationships that lead to professional advancement and 
power. 
The argument that educators should take seriously the risk of stigma 
that is unnecessarily perpetuated when we fail to narrowly tailor segre­
gation to its protectionist purpose is aided by judicial precedent as well. 
Courts applying the equal protection doctrine have, in other contexts be­
sides athletics, struck down "separate but equal" based on the stigma 
inherent in separation. 109 Most notably, the stigma inherent in separation 
led the Supreme Court to rule in Brown v. Board of Education that seg­
regating schools by race-"even though the physical facilities and other 
'tangible' factors may be equal"-violated equal protectionY0 Segrega­
tion "generates a feeling of inferiority" that detrimentally impairs the ed­
ucational opportunities of those being excluded. 111 The Court also rec­
ognized segregation's tendency to enforce inferiority when it ruled that 
Virginia could not defend the exclusion of women from its state military 
college by creating a separate leadership program for women. 112 Because 
the Court's analysis included other tangible differences between the pro­
gram, the inherent inequality of segregation was not conclusive in this 
case as it was in Brown. 113 Nevertheless, the Court's decision-best 
known for its clear admonition against sex classifications based on 
106 See Id. (noting that the "culture of the golf club world has always been heavily dominated by 
the males who are leaders in corporate and community life and who often assume leadership roles 
in their local country clubs as well."). 
107 One such pervasive, negative stereotype is that women play more slowly because they do not 
drive as far. Yet because distance does not necessarily equal accuracy, the basis of this stereotype 
is questionable. 
108 See Cohen et al., supra note 96, at 221-24. 
109 Brown v. Bd. of&!. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [black students] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to 
be undone."); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("Over the years, this Court has consist­
ently repudiated '(d)istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to 
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" (Citations omitted)); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) ("By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who 
are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause."). 
110 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
111 Id. at 494. 
112 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996). 
113 Dana Robinson, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9 J. OF 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 336 (1998) ("In the same way that Brown incorporated an evaluation 
of inferiority, so also VMI incorporates an evaluation. But whether there is inferiority asserted is 
not necessarily conclusive. We know that inferiority is not conclusive because VMI begins by stating 
that inferiority is asserted, but the Court goes on with a very lengthy evaluation of other tangible and 
intangible factors."). 
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"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or pref­
erences of males and females" 114 is rooted in the concern that such gen­
eralizations and stereotypes contribute to the "denigration" 115 of the ex­
cluded sex. u 6 
Yet in sports cases, concerns for denigration or stigma, when in­
cluded in the courts' analyses, have played a more limited role. Still, 
courts have ruled against unequal treatment of girls' teams after recog­
nizing the stigmatizing potential of tangible disparities. 117 For example, 
the Michigan High School Athletic Association violated Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause by scheduling six girls' sports in the nontradi­
tional season, including girls' basketball, which it scheduled in the fall 
instead of the traditional winter season. 118 The district court found that 
girls were disadvantaged in such tangible ways as difficulty obtaining in­
season equipment, diminished opportunities for national recognition and 
honors, and exclusion from promotional events and tournament opportu­
nities that are scheduled with traditional-season athletes in mind. u 9 Ad­
ditionally, however, the court recognized the psychological impact of the 
scheduling decision. 12°For example, depriving female basketball players 
of the opportunity to play their sport when the rest of the state and the 
nation is participating in or enjoying scholastic and collegiate basketball 
sends the "psychological message" that girls are " 'second class' or that 
their athletic role is of less value than that of boys. "121 
In another case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized 
that girls were disadvantaged by the scheduling of the majority of their 
basketball games on weeknights (Monday through Thursday). 122 Boys' 
games were scheduled on Fridays and Saturdays to maximize attendance 
by parents and other fans: a practice that also minimized for boys-but 
maximized for girls-the academic inconvenience of playing and travel­
ing on school nights. 123 In addition to these tangible disparities, the court 
also recognized the denigrating effect of unequal treatment: "the practice 
of scheduling almost twice as many boys' basketball games on primetime 
nights sends a message that female athletes are subordinate to their male 
counterparts and are 'second-class.' "124 The foregoing case illustrations 
114 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
m1d. 
116 Robinson, supra note 113, at 336. 
117 See Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 2d 805, 838 (W.D. 
Mich. 2001), ajf'd, 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005), ajf'd, 459 F.3d 
676 (6th Cir. 2006). 
118 Id. at 807. 
119 Id. at 838. 
1201d. at 824, 837. 
121 Id. at 837. 
122 Parker v. Franklin Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 923-924 (7th Cir. 2012). 
123 Id. 
1241d. at 923. 
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show the negative effects of sex-discrimination-derived stigma in the ath­
letics context. Degendering sport is a way to mitigate this concern. 
B. Unequal Resources 
One of the most recognizable downsides to separating athletic op­
portunities by sex is the risk that separate programs in the allocation of 
resources and opportunities. 125 Title IX and equal protection doctrine 
both attempt to mitigate this risk by requiring separate programs receive 
equal treatment as measured by such tangible factors as the quantity of 
opportunities and the qualities of facilities, uniforms, equipment, sched­
ule of competition, access to coaching, and other aspects of the pro­
gram. 126 Yet there is evidence that such inequalities persist. 127 And when 
they do, they signal to girls that their athletic pursuits are not as worthy 
as those of boys. Title IX and equal protection doctrine require that "sep­
arate 11 be 11 equal, "128 but in reality, it rarely is. Segregated sports facilitate 
inequitable allocation of resources that tend to track cultural bias in favor 
of men's sports. 129 For example, high school booster clubs are more en­
thusiastic about and successful at raising funds to support boys' sports. 130 
Despite OCR' s insistence that uneven fundraising by booster clubs does 
not excuse unequal treatment, unequal treatment nevertheless occurs. 131 
These inequities not only ensure that boys teams are better equipped to 
cultivate athletic talent, but also serve to make athletic opportunities more 
attractive to boys than to girls. 
Obviously, unequal resources contribute to observed gender differ­
ences to some extent. Gender-free sports can mitigate the replication of 
gender stereotypes that occurs when athletic opportunities are separated 
by sex because they remove the structural vulnerability to inequitable 
125 Note, Cheering on Women and Girls in Spons: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppres
sion, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1627, 1630, 1633--35 (1997). 
126 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31-106.42 (2018). 
127 Postsecondary athletics Title IX complaints have risen in recent years. See generally Celene 
Reynolds, The Mobilization of Title IX across U.S. Colleges and Universities, 1994-2014, 66 Social 
Problems 245, 255-56 (2019). According to one recent study, "[c]omplaints citing three athletic 
issues-interests and abilities (106.41cl), equal opportunity (106.4lc), and meeting the requirements 
of part three of the three-part test (106.41cl-3)-represent[ed] 74 percent of the total filings in 
2014." Id. at 256. 
128 34 C.F.R. § 106.4l(b-c) (2018). 

129 See generally George, supra note 56, at 1113-32. 

130 See generally Powell Latimer, Title IX compliance sometimes means turning down money, 

STARNEWS ONLINE (Nov. 28, 2010), https://www.starnewsonline.com/news/20101128/title-ix­
compliance-sometirnes-means-tuming-down-money?fbclid= Iw AR3UXhsKDBui7X2hg-oGJPgCgg­
PsdRTUfJ aGS-vOQYbHPh7I2knpnZw lrVY [https://perma.cc/6RX7-6H39]. 
131 Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, Regional Director, Office of Civil Rights to Dr. Dorothy Galo, 
Superintendent, Hingham Public School District (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www2.ed.gov/about/of­
fices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/O 1105003-a.htmlb [https: //perma. cc/2ZF6-FMEU] ("Where 
booster clubs provide benefits or services that assist only teams of one sex, the district must ensure 
that teams of the other sex receive equivalent benefits and services."). 
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distribution of resources. Whether its financial support comes entirely 
from the schools or is supplemented by third-party fundraising, a single 
team that is open to boys and girls alike ensures that all members have 
the same quality of coaching, the same opportunities for practice and 
competition, and the same perks and benefits that makes athletic partici­
pation attractive and enjoyable. Equal investment of resources will pro­
vide female athletes opportunities to cultivate their athletic abilities. 
C. Transgender Inclusion 
In addition to pushing back on the stigma inherent in separation, 
gender-free sports also reinforce the rationale for transgender inclusion, 
as well as provide opportunities for those who identify as non-binary to 
participate without having to compromise the affirmation of that identity. 
Massachusetts is among several other states in which the athletic 
association governing high school sports provides an unqualified right to 
transgender students to participate in athletics in the category that corre­
sponds to their gender identity. 132 Specifically, the MIAA' s policy is to 
rely on the gender determination made by the student's district, 133 which 
as a matter of state law "shall mean a person's gender-related identity, 
appearance or behavior, whether or not that gender-related identity, ap­
pearance or behavior is different from that traditionally associated with 
the person's physiology or assigned sex at birth. "134 At least one school 
district has adopted a specific policy of its own which guarantees 
transgender students the right to participate in athletics according to their 
gender identity-in addition to addressing related, off-the-field issues like 
inclusive bathrooms and locker room facilities. 135 But even in districts 
132 See, e.g., WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, 2018-19 OFFICIAL 
HANDBOOK 32-33 (2018), http://www.wiaa.com/conDocs/Con1782/Handbook%20Website.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UFJ4-Q8P6]. Additionally, athletic associations in California, Colorado, Connect­
icut, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming have similar inclusive policies, many 
of them modeled on Washington's. See Erin Buzuvis, As Who They Really Are: Expanding Oppor­
tunities for Transgender Athletics to Panicipate in Youth and Scholastic Spans, 34 LAW & INEQ. 
341, 348-50 (2016); K-12 Policies, TRANSATHLETE (last visited Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.trans­
athlete.com/k-12 [https://perma.cc/62YH-'IT6V] (listing high school policies for transgender stu­
dent athletes from throughout the United States). As policies of state athletic associations, these rules 
create rights as a matter of private law that schools agree to uphold as a condition for membership 
in the associations. In some of these states, transgender students' rights that exist as a matter of 
private law are also protected by public law, a statute or regulatory interpretation thereof. See, e.g., 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5(f) (West 2018); Buzuvis, supra, at 362. 
133 See MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at42. Rule 43.3.l of the MIAA's Rules and Regulations 
Governing Athletes states: "A student shall not be excluded from participation on a gender-specific 
sports team that is consistent with the student's bona fide gender identity." Id. 
134 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7, cl.59 (2018) (defining "Gender identity"). 
135 See generally FRAMINGHAM HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT, FRAMINGHAM HIGH 
SCHOOL ATHLETIC HANDBOOK FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES, COACHES, AND PARENTS 4-5 (2019­
2020), https://www.framingham.kl2.ma.us/cms/lib/MA01907569/Centricity/Domain/81/2018­
2019%20SY%20Meetings/05.0l.19/V. %20E. %20%20FHS %20Athletics %20Handbook.docx.pdf 
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that have not adopted such a policy, the state law itself creates the expec­
tation that school officials would acknowledge a transgender student's 
affirmed gender identity for all purposes, including athletics. 
1. Benefits to Transgender Youth 
Thus, in Massachusetts-and in the other states whose athletic as­
sociations have similarly inclusive policies-a transgender athlete's par­
ticipation in the category that matches their gender identity is unqualified: 
it is not subject to any special considerations, such as safety or competi­
tive equity, as is the case in several states. 136 It is also not conditioned on 
any particular medical intervention, such as hormone treatment, as poli­
cies in other states require. 137 In reality, this means a transgender girl is 
permitted to play girls' sports, and a transgender boy has the same rights 
with respect to boys' sports. Such inclusion affirms the athlete's gender 
identity and thus serves as a powerful source of socioemotional support. 
It also serves as a protective factor against psychological and emotional 
damage, including depression, anxiety, and self-harm, to which 
transgender youth are vulnerable. 138 On the other hand, excluding a 
[https://perma.cc/55GF-68PJ] [hereinafter FRAMINGHAM HANDBOOK] (stating the school's "Inclu­
sive Sports Participation Policy"); Jim Haddadin, Framingham: New School Policy Supports 
Transgender Athletes, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.metrowestdailyn­
ews.com/news/20180313/framingham-new-school-policy-supports-transgender-athletes 
[https: //perma.cc/6G4E-ABG8]. 
136 See, e.g.. MAINE PRINCIPALS' ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK 19-21 (2019-2020), 
http://www.mpa.cc/images/pdfs/handbookl920.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J3W-P8P4]; NEW JERSEY 
STATE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, NJSIAA & NJSCA COACHES HANDBOOK 20­
22 (2019--2020), https://www .njsiaa.org/sites/default/files/document/Coaches %20Hand­
book%202019-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PQA-JJRE]. 
137 See, e.g. , NEBRASKA SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, GENDER 
PARTICIPATION POLICY 34-37 (2019-2020), https://nsaa-static.s3.amazonaws.com/textfile/yb/by­
laws.pdf [bttps://perma.cc/2JQL-VH3D]. Athletic associations in Delaware, Idaho, Missouri, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Wisconsin also have policies that require medical 
transition. See Buzuvis, supra note 132, at 345-46; For a critique of policies that require hormone 
treatments as a condition for trans gender student's participation in athletics that correspond to gender 
identity, see id. at 364-74. 
In Texas, for school athletics, a student's gender "shall be determined based on [the] student's 
birth certificate." UNIVERSITY INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND CONTEST RULES, 
NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY 53 (2019-2020), https://www.uiltexas.org/files/policy/2019-2020­
full-uil-<:onstitution. pdf [https://perma.cc/L2WP-YD36]. Five other states-Alabama, Indiana, Lou­
isiana, Kentucky, North Carolina-limit an athlete's participation to the designation on their birth 
certificate, effectively prohibiting transgender students from competing according to their gender 
identities, while the remaining state athletic associations have either no policy or a policy of leaving 
it up to individual schools to decide. See Buzuvis, supra note 132, at 343-45; for a critique of these 
policies, see id. at 352-63. 
138 See M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect Modem 
Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 957-58 (2015) (citing an amicus 
brief prepared by the American Academy of Pediatrics and other leading medical organizations, in 
support of a transgender student's case challenging her exclusion from facilities that correspond to 
her gender identity); Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D'Augelli, Transgender Youth and Life­
Threatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 527, 534-35 (2007); GABE 
MURCHISON, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, SUPPORTING AND CARING FOR TRANSGENDER CHILDREN 
12-17 (Sep. 2016), https: IIassets2 .hrc .org/files/documents/SupportingCaringforTransChildren. pdf 
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transgender student from the sports that match their gender identity, as 
well as imposing requirements on their participation that do not apply to 
other students, stigmatizes them and contributes to the potential for psy­
chological harm. 139 In addition, exclusionary policies that restrict an ath­
lete's gender-identity-based participation would likely deter many 
transgender athletes from participating in sports altogether. Thus, inclu­
sive policies maximize opportunities for transgender students to attain the 
benefits of athletic participation on one's physical health, character, aca­
demic performance, peer relationships, and self-esteem-a privilege 
owned by other students .140 
Yet despite these powerful benefits to transgender athletes them­
selves, critics of their inclusion-particularly the inclusion of transgender 
girls in girls' sports-have argued that opening up girls' sports to partic­
ip<1.tion by transgender girls is unfair to their cisgender competitors be­
cause it puts the latter at a competitive disadvantage. 141 Just as legislators 
in the 1970s assumed that girls needed protection from the dominance of 
boys, whom they deemed categorically superior athletes solely by virtue 
of their sex, these critics also. view transgender girls as categorically su­
perior athletes solely by virtue of their having been assigned male at 
birth. 142 But the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Attorney General 
v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association rejected the idea 
that girls are categorically and always in need of protection from the 
participation of boys-a holding that logically extends to support the in­
clusion of transgender girls as well. 143 Thus, in Massachusetts (of all 
states), because of its exceptional state constitutional law permitting boys 
to play on girls' teams, arguments against the participation of pre-transi­
tion transgender girls are particularly out of place. By normalizing coed 
competition, the existence of gender-free athletic opportunities would by 
extension render trans gender girls' inclusion less controversial and might 
therefore encourage more transgender girls to avail themselves of the 
[https://perma.cc/KX28-QJSY] (position statement of the American College of Osteopathic Pedia­
tricians and the American Pediatric Osteopathy Association). 
139 Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1306-07 (M.D. Fla. 2018) 
(acknowledging the stigma in excluding transgender students from facilities that correspond to their 
gender identities); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Talbot Cty., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 725 (D. Md. 2018) 
(finding that the exclusion of a transgender student from the locker room that corresponds to his 
gender identity is harmful to the student, because it interferes with the student's gender transition 
and thus exacerbates gender dysphoria). 
140 See Richard Bailey, Evaluating the Relationship between Physical Education, Spon and Social 
Inclusion, 57 EDUC. REV. 71, 80 (2005); Michael W. Beets & Kenneth H. Pitetti, Contribution of 
Physical Education and Spon to Health-Related Fitness in High School Students, 75 J. SCH. HEALTH 
25, 28 (2005); Russell R. Pate et al., Spons Panicipation and Health-Related Behaviors Among US 
Youth, 154 ARCH. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 904 (2000). 
141 See generally Yannis Pitsiladis et al., Beyond Fairness: The Biology of Inclusion. for 
Transgender and Intersex Athletes, 15 CURRENT SPORTS MED. REPORTS 386 (2016). 
142 See, e.g., Sangree, supra note 56, at 417-18 (discussing the legislators' paternalistic motiva­
tions in passing Title IX); Michael J. Lenzi, The Trans Athlete Dilemma: A Constitutional 
Transgender Student-Athlete Polices, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 841, 843-44 (describing two examples of 
transgendered students-athletes winning a competition and generating controversy). 
143 See Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass 'n, 393 N.E.2d at 294-95. 
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opportunity. 
Finally, the option to engage in gender-free sports could promote 
participation among transgender girls and transgender boys by giving 
them an alternative to what in some cases might be inferior alternatives. 
Sometimes transgender athletes, particularly transgender female athletes, 
are criticized and harassed for asserting their right to compete with 
girls. 144 A gender-free option would minimize this risk while still provid­
ing an alternative to the potentially delegitimizing experience of compet­
ing in one's natal'sex category. 
2. Benefits to non-binary students 
Not all transgender students identify as male or female. In fact, 
there are likely more transgender students who identify themselves as 
something other than male or female, such as non-binary or genderqueer, 
than there are transgender students who do identify as male or female. 145 
Yet, trans gender students in this category are often an afterthought in 
discussions about their inclusion in sport, which mostly focus on when 
and whether a transgender individual who identifies as male or female 
can participate on teams that correspond to that gender. This does not 
mean non-binary students are entirely excluded from athletic participa­
tion, since inclusive and exclusive policies alike would permit non-binary 
students to at least participate on the teams that match their birth or legal 
sex. 146 But in light of the fact that nearly all high school athletic opportu­
nities are designated as male or female, non-binary athletes, unlike other 
athletes, almost never have the option to participate in athletics in a cat­
egory that validates their gender identity. 147 The introduction of some 
gender-free options would give non-binary athletes the option to partici­
pate in a manner that does not create the dissonance between the activity's 
gendered context and the athlete's sense of self. 148 
144 See, e.g., Katie Barnes, They Are Champions, ESPNW (May 29, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/espnw/feature/23592317 /how-two-transgender-athletes-fighting-compete­
sports-love [https://perma.cc/NT35-WFQY] (describing public criticism faced by transgender fe­
male athlete). 
145 Esther L. Meerwijk & Jae M. Sevelius, Transgender Population Size in the United States: A 
Meta-Regression of Population-Based Probability Samples, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH el, e6 (Feb. 
2017). 
146 Some inclusive policies go further and permit non-binary students to choose whichever cate­
gory feels like the best fit. See, e.g., FRAMINGHAM HANDBOOK, supra note 135, at 4-5. 
147 Caroline Voyles, Sex Segregation in Sport: A Denial of Rights and Opportunities for Health, 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (June 28, 2019), https://www.hhrjoumal.org/2019/06/sex-segregation-in­
sport-a~denial-of-rights-and-opportunities-for-health/ [https: //perma.cc/7CR7-VPCP]. 
148 Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 967 (2019) ("The best 
way to accommodate non-binary athletes may be incremental moves toward eliminating sex classi­
fications in sports."); Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique ofOlympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 
31 WIS. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 29, 48 (2016) ("The approach of eliminating gender categories [in 
sporting events] would also be inclusive of those individuals whose gender-identities are non-binary 
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Transgender students may have expanding opportunities to easily 
change their legal sex to non-binary-a change that, while positive in 
many ways, could theoretically limit their legal rights to access athletic 
opportunities designated by binary gender category. The state of Califor­
nia for examplepermits those citizens with a non-binary gender identity 
to amend the gender designation on their birth certificates to a non-binary 
designation. 149 Additionally, California state law already permits 
transgender students to participate in athletics in a manner "consistent 
with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on the 
pupil's records. "150 It is possible that a non-binary student's decision to 
amend their birth certificate to list their non-binary gender designation 
could create confusion over which athletic opportunities are appropriate 
for the students, since technically, neither girls' nor boys' sports are con­
sistent with either the student's gender identity or the gender listed on 
their records, depending on what "records" the school official decided to 
consider. To be sure, a school district's decision to prohibit a non-binary 
student from participating in both boys' and girls' athletics altogether 
would absurdly and unnecessarily pervert the spirit of the laws in Cali­
fornia, designed to maximize inclusion and recognition for all 
transgender individuals, including those who identify as non-binary. 151 
But gender-free athletic options would mitigate the vulnerability of non­
binary students to this exclusion by ensuring some athletic opportunities 
would remain available even if a school official chose to interpret the law 
in this restrictive way. More importantly, the promotion of gender-free 
athletic opportunities would be an appropriate response to the increasing 
legal recognition of non-binary identities because laws that legalize non­
binary gender designations are responsive to, and promoting of, an un­
derstanding of the complexity of gender and recognition of the limitations 
of only two categories. 
IV. DEGENDERING SPORT: START WITH GoLF 
While acknowledging that some degree of separation is warranted 
to ensure that athletic opportunities are preserved for girls, this Article 
has so far pushed back on the idea that all opportunities must be sepa­
rated.Gender-free athletic options are consistent with Massachusetts con­
stitutional law, 152 mitigate stereotypes about female inferior athleticism, 
or fluid."). 
149 See S.B. 179, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
ISO CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 221.S(t) (West 2018). 
1s1 See, e.g., Gender Recognition Act, S.B. 179, 2017-18 Sess. (CA 2017) ("It is the policy of 
the State of California that every person deserves full legal recognition and equal treatment under 
the law and to ensure that intersex, trans gender, and nonbinary people have state-issued identification 
documents that provide full legal recognition of their accurate gender identity."). 
152 See supra Part I. 
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promotes equal treatment of athletes within the same sport, and reflect 
the principles and best practices of transgender inclusion.153 But as a 
practical matter, how do we determine which opportunities are appropri­
ate for continued segregation, and which should be integrated and desig­
nated for all athletes regardless of gender? 
To answer this question, sport organizers should consider the extent 
to which girls' participation currently benefits from protectionism inher­
ent in segregation, as well as whether changing to an integrated model 
has the potential to enhance participation, such as by removing structural 
inequalities that could be suppressing girls' interest. If separation in a 
given sport contributes relatively little to girls' current participation, and 
integration offers high potential to improve girls' participation, then this 
sport is a good candidate for integration. This part will apply this formula 
to the sport of high school golf as it is played in Massachusetts and con­
clude that the sport is a good candidate to be reorganized without regard 
to participants' gender. 
A. 	 Few Female Golfers Currently Benefit from Protectionist 
Segregation 
The reason schools segregate sports by sex is to ensure that girls 
have similar opportunities as boys to benefit from athletic participation. 
Historic and continued discrimination that can reasonably be expected to 
have impaired their interests and abilities, as well as generalized physical 
differences that could disproportionately disadvantage girls in some ath­
letic opportunities if those opportunities were distributed without regard 
to gender on basis of talent alone. Recent surveys reflect that boys al­
ready receive the majority of high school athletic opportunities, both na­
tionally (approximately 57% for the 2018-2019 school year)154 and in the 
state of Massachusetts (approximately 51 % for the 2018-2019 school 
year), 155 highlighting the particular importance of protecting girls' exist­
ing opportunities. Nevertheless, while girls' sports are important to that 
end, segregation is not the only way to ensure girls' participation. Exclu­
sions based on sex should be narrowly-tailored per the Supreme Judicial 
153 See supra Part 11. 
154 KARISSA L. NIEHOFF, NAT'L FED'N OF HIGH SCH. Ass'NS, 2019-20 NFHS HANDBOOK 54 
(2019), https://www.nfhs.org/media/1020439/2019-20-nfhs-handbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EXK7-F6G2]. This figure was calculated by dividing the number of boy survey 
participants from 2018-19 by the total number of participants. See id. 
155 MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC AsS'N, 2018-2019 ATHLETICS PARTICIPATION SURVEY 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2020), http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa generated bin/documents/basic mod­
ule/ParticipationSurveyOverview201819.pdf [https: //perma-:-cc/83J7-3W96] [hereinafter MIAA 
PARTICIPATION SURVEY]. This figure was calculated by dividing the number of boy survey partici­
pants from 2018-19 by the total number of participants. See id. 
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Court's analysis in Attorney General v. M/AA. 156 Tactics like degender­
ing select sports, which do not threaten to diminish existing opportuni­
ties, should be considered. 
Girls are already an extreme minority among Massachusetts high 
school golfers. There were 670 of them for the 2018-2019 school year­
the most recent year for which complete data is available-compared to 
4212 boys. 157 Many high school sports are dominated by one sex or the 
other. 158 For example, girls make up less than 1% of all Massachusetts 
high school football players. 159 But golf, in which girls constitute approx­
imately 13 % of all participants, 160 experiences this gender imbalance 
even though it is both a boys' and girls' sport. 161 
B. 	 The (Former) Tournament Rule Discriminated Against 
Girls on Boys Teams 
Moreover, there is reason to suspect that girls' interests and abilities 
in golf, reflected in their low participation noted above, are suppressed 
by structural differences that would not exist if golf was organized as a 
gender-free opportunity. One clear example of discrimination against fe­
male golfers was recently addressed by the MIAA when it changed the 
rule that required female golfers who play on boys' teams to nevertheless 
participate in the girls' post-season individual tournament, which takes 
place in a different season than the boys' .162 Former rule 43.2.1.2 was 
intended to protect girls' athletic opportunities: because it also prohibited 
boys on girls' teams from competing for an individual post-season title 
against girls, it ensured that only girls can compete for the girls' individ­
ual championships. 163 It also arguably protected girls' opportunities by 
allowing them to bypass the boys' post-season tournament ai1d compete 
individually in a post-season girls' tournament instead. Yet however well 
intentioned, the rule discriminated against female golfers. The girls' 
156 Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 296. 
157 MIAA PARTICIPATION SURVEY, supra note 155, at 1. 
158 See Id. 
m Id. This figure was calculated by dividing the total number of girls reported to be playing 
football by the total number of football players. 
160 Id. This figure was calculated by dividing the total number of girls reported to be playing golf 
by the total number of golf players. 
161 Some other sports with both boy and girl participants have a higher proportion of girls to boys 
than that in golf. For instance, for 2018-2019, girls constituted approximately 22% of all rugby 
players, and approximately 23% of all ice hockey players. Id. There are also sports-such as field 
hockey-in which girls significantly outnumber boys. Id. 
162 See Craig Larson, MIAA Revises Rules on Mixed-gender Teams, BOSTON GLOBE (Sep. 26, 
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/high­
schools/2018/09/26/schnotes/TZzK2qBBPxOyqjhZqDielM/story .html [https: //perma.cc/Y79F­
WU9N]. 
163 See MIAA HANDBOOK 2017-2019, supra note 91. Before the Oct. 3, 2018 revision, Rule 
43.2.1.2 included references to "individual golf .... " Larson, supra note 162. 
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regular season is in the spring, which meant that any female golfer on a 
boys' team must defer their individual title aspirations for an entire sea­
son. 164 Also, because the high school post-season tournaments in Massa­
chusetts serve to determine both team and individual champions, girls 
could in fact participate in the tournament, but only in the limited capac­
ity as a member of her team. 165 A girl who happened to play well in that 
capacity might help her team but would be ineligible for individual 
awards that her score would have entitled her to had she been a male 
member of her team. 166 
This is precisely what happened to Emily Nash on October 24, 
2017, when she competed in the Division III boys golf Central Mass 
regional tournament in Uxbridge, Massachusetts. 167 That day, shooting 
from the back tee, Nash shot 3 below a par of 75-the lowest score of 
the tournament. 168 Yet the male athlete who took four more strokes than 
Nash was awarded the individual regional championship and the oppor­
tunity to move on to the state championship. 169 This outcome took the 
media by surprise, and stories about the girl denied the championship 
title she had clearly earned spread quickly around the world, 170 especially 
the world of golf. 171 The disputed fact that Nash and her coach knew or 
164 The MIAA Golf Committee reiterated this rule in the 2017 Boys' Fall Golf Sport Specific 
Information, which states-as a rule for 2017 boys' Fall golf sectional/state tournaments-that 
"[g]irls playing on a fall boys team CANNOT BE ENTERED IN THE BOYS FALL INDIVIDUAL 
TOURNAMENT. THEY CAN ONLY PLAY IN THE BOYS TEAM TOURNAMENT If qualified, 
they can play in the spring Girls Sectional and State Championships." MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC 
ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2017 BOYS' FALL GOLF SPORT SPECIFIC INFORMATION 5 (Oct. 11, 2017), 




167 Lunenburg Girl Won a Boys' Golf Tournament but Was Denied the Trophy, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Oct. 25, 2017), https ://www.bostonglobe.com/ sports/high-schools/2017I10/25/lunenberg-emily­
nash-won-boys-golf-toumament-but-was-denied-winner-trophy-because-she-girl/WtZDRn­
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http: I /www.sentinelandenterprise.com/highschoolsports/ ci _ 31562283 Inational-outcry-after-nash­
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171 T.J. Auclair, Emily Nash, Who Was Denied Trophy in Boys' Tournament She Won, Receives 
Invitation to Annika Invitational, PGA (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.pga.com/news/golf­
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should have known about the rule, 172 as well as the fact that Nash would 
have an opportunity to compete for an individual title in the girls' tour­
nament held in the spring, did little to mitigate criticism of the Massa­
chusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association for the unfair outcome of the 
Division III tournament. 
Nash was not even the first female golfer negatively affected by 
former Rule 43.2.1.2. In 2005, Lindsey Thomka, a member of the boys' 
golf team at Springfield's Cathedral High School, sued the MIAA for the 
right to participate as an individual in the boys' post-season tournament 
notwithstanding Rule 43 .2.1.2. 173 Then, as now, the MIAA sponsored 
boys' regional and state tournaments in the fall to determine team and 
individual post-season champions, while a state tournament for girls was 
held in the spring. 174 The Cathedral team's overall performance in the 
regional tournament did not qualify it for advancement to the state tour­
nament, but Thomka individually earned the fourth-best score. 175 Based 
on that performance, she would have had the opportunity to continue on 
and compete for the individual title if she had been a boy, but former 
Rule 43.2.1.2 prohibited her from doing so. 176 Instead, MIAA officials 
insisted that Thomka' s opportunity to compete for an individual title 
would have to wait for spring when the girls' tournament took place. 177 
This exclusion prompted Thomka' s lawsuit, which resulted in a prelimi­
nary injunction that allowed her to compete in the boys' tournament. 178 
In response to the court's order, the MIAA accepted Thomka into the 
tournament and sua sponte suspended the rule that required girls to play 
from the front tees. 179 Thomka competed in the state tournament from the 
back tees, and she finished the tournament in last place. 180 
In 2007, the superior court in Hampden County issued a permanent 
injunction against former Rule 43 .2.1.2-as it applies to female golfers-
http://golfweek.com/2017I10/26/outrage-grows-as-high-school-golfer-emily-nash-gets-no-relief­
from-massachusetts-rules-committee/ [https://perma.cc/ZZJ3-WQ4L]. 
172 Nash told one reporter that she "wasn't aware, until after [her] round that if [she] won, [she] 
wouldn't be able to get the title or the trophy." Bill Doyle, Lunenburg's Emily Nash 'disappointed' 
with ML4A rule preventing her from winning Division 3 golf title, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Oct. 25, 
2017), https://www.telegram.com/ sports/20171025/lunenburgs-emily-nash-disappointed-with­
miaa-rule-preventing-her-from-winning-division-3-golf-title [https: //perma.cc/6EZL-6QYU]. 
173 Thomka v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. 051028, 2007 WL 867084, at *1-4 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2007), ajf'd in part, vacated in part, 952 N.E.2d 462 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2011). 
174 Id. at *2. 
175 Id. at *3. 
176 Id. at *5. 
m Id. at *1-2. 
178 Id. at *3. 
179 Thomka's lawsuit did not challenge either the MIAA's general rule restricting her to the front 
tees, nor did she challenge the decision to suspend the rule and make her play from the back tees in 
the state tournament. Id. at *3-4. 
180 Id. at *4. 
30 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights [Vol. 25: 1 
on the grounds that it violated the state constitution's ERA. 181 As the 
court saw it, the rule was facially neutral because it appeared to provide 
"equal opportunities for male and female athletes to compete for individ­
ual, as well as team championships, in their respective sports. "182 But its 
application is disadvantageous to female golfers whose schools choose 
only to sponsor a fall team. Those girls are denied an opportunity to 
compete for an individual title "against the same level of competition and 
some of the same competitors they faced through the fall season when 
their skills are their sharpest after having been honed by a season of ca­
maraderie, coaching, and competition. "183 The court acknowledged that 
female golfers who compete on boys' teams in the fall and also play other 
sports in the spring are particularly inconvenienced by the delay between 
the regular and post-season play since they have little opportunity to prac­
tice on their own in preparation for the golf tournament. 184 They might 
experience this interruption not only as a logistical challenge (i.e., man­
aging the competing time demands of two post-seasons at once) but also 
as something that diminishes the personal significance of the post-season 
golf opportunities (it has lesser value to these athletes because it occurs 
during "softball season" or however they may view the spring). Boys 
have no such problem since at the time of the court's decision, the MIAA 
held boys' championship golf tournaments in both the spring and the 
fall. 185 And, while the MIAA has since discontinued the boys' spring 
tournament, 186 the disparity persists because there are no Massachusetts 
high schools that only sponsor a girls' golf team without offering a coun­
terpart opportunity to boys. 187 As such, all male golfers in Massachusetts 
compete in the fall-the same season as their individual's tournament­
and the disadvantage of having one's regular team season and individual 
tournament scheduled in different seasons is still one that only female 
golfers face. 
On appeal, however, the state appellate court vacated the injunction 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not provided notice to the Attorney 
General-a required condition to litigate state constitutional claims. 188 As 
a result, former Rule 43.2.1.2 was still in effect in the fall of 2017 when 
it prevented regional tournament winner Emily Nash from receiving the 
181 Id. at *8. 

182 Id. at *6. 





185 Id. at *2. 
186 The MIAA's current Rule 35.1.1 states, in relevant part, "[a] school may offer golf in either 
Fall or Spring, but the Boys Team Tournament is held in the Fall and the Girls Team Tournament 
is held in the Spring." MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 36. 
187 See MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, PARTICIPATION SURVEY DATA (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2020), http://miaa.net/con­
tentm/easy _pages/view .php?page_id = 137&sid=38&menu _id=214 
[https://perma.cc/L9WY-957K]. 
188 Thomka v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1105, 2011WL3802192, 
at *l (2011). 
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individual regional championship title or moving on to the state tourna­
ment. Indeed, the only rule change to come out of the Thomka case was 
an amendment clarifying that the rule restricting girls to hitting from the 
front tees only applies to the regular season. 189 Even though Thomka' s 
lawsuit failed because of a procedural issue rather than the substance of 
its equal protection argument, the MIAA continued to exclude girls from 
competing for individual titles in the premier fall tournament. 190 It took 
the national public outcry to the tournament rule's application to Emily 
Nash to force the MIAA to revisit the rule. 191 
In October 2018, the MIAA eliminated individual golf from the 
tournament rule (Rule 43.2.1.2), that restricted athletes on cross-sex 
teams to compete only in the post-season tournaments designated for their 
sex. 192 Now, a female golfer who participates on a boys team in the fall 
may still participate in the girls' spring tournament, but she may also 
participate in the fall boys' fall tournament as both an individual and a 
member of her team, to the extent she qualifies like any other golfer. 
Yet, because this rule was only recently changed, it nevertheless provides 
important context for disproportionately low (when compared to the pro­
portion of participants) interest and participation of girls in high school 
189 See MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 67. Rule 70.2 and 70.3 of the MIAA's Rules and 
Regulations Governing Athletes state: 
70.2.Female golfers participating on a boys' team during the regular season play must hit 
from the tee box that is placed closest (yet in front of) the tee box the boys' team is 
hitting from (regardless of marker color). 
70.3.Female golfers competing on a boys' team must hit from the boys' tees at the MIAA 
Divisional and State Tournaments. 
Id. 
190 Not only did the tournament violate the Massachusetts ERA, it likely would have been found 
to violate Title IX if it had been challenged on those grounds as well. For one reason, the MIAA 
may be found to have failed to provide "equal athletic opportunity" for boys and girls, considering 
the MIAA's inequitable "[s]cheduling of games and practice time .... " See 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(c)(3) (2018). For another, MIAA's facially neutral policy resulted in Nash being treated 
differently from her male teammates-had they been the top-performing tournament team members, 
as opposed to Nash. For one circuit court that faced a case that arose under similar circumstances 
to Nash's, such inequality amounted to sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. See Mercer v. 
Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that Duke University violated Title IX 
when the coach allowed a female kicker to try out and make the football team, but then excluded 
her from participation in the sport on the basis of her sex.); see also David S. Cohen, Emily Nash 
Denied Boys' Golf Trophy - Which Violates Title IX, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https: //www. rollings tone. com/ cul tu re/culture-sports/ emily-nash-denied-boys-golf-trophy-which-vi­
olates-title-ix-115296/ [https://perma.cc/ES8U-ESXP] (applying Mercer to the tournament rule and 
concluding that it violates Title IX because, like Duke's treatment of Mercer, the tournament rule 
permits a golfer like Emily Nash to compete alongside boys but then distinguishes her and limits 
quality of her opportunity because of sex). 
191 Greg Dudek, MIAAforms committee to study rule that denied Emily Nash golf trophy, BOSTON 
HERALD (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.bostonherald.com/2017I12/08/miaa-forms-committee-to­
study-rule-that-denied-emily-nash-golf-trophyI [https ://perma. cc/9JJD-3N5T]. 
192 See Larson, supra note 162 ("As of [Sep. 26, 2018], the words 'boys' and 'individual golf 
were removed from Rules 43.2.1and43.2.1.2 in the MIAA Handbook regarding 'Boys' and Girls' 
on the Same Team.' And in the MIAA's Tournament Format for golf, the postseason is listed as 
'2018 Fall Golf Championship,' with no reference to gender."); see also MIAA HANDBOOK 2017­
2019, supra note 91. 
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golf. For the large number of high school girls in Massachusetts, whose 
schools have no girls' golf team, the unequal opportunities that have per­
sisted for girls who play on boys' teams has surely signaled the sport as 
less than appealing and welcoming to girls. 
C. 	Girls Who Play on Girls' Teams Are Disadvantaged by the 
Spring Season 
Another disparity that has likely suppressed girls' participation in 
golf-and which will continue to do so-is the scheduling of girls' golf 
in the spring season. Spring is a disadvantageous season for high school 
golf in Massachusetts. The weather in spring is less reliably suitable for 
golf than that in fall, 193 in which golf enjoys a longer season under more 
advantageous conditions. 194 In addition, fall is the season for college 
recruiting and applications .195 Similar facts about spring and fall golf led 
a federal district court in Michigan to conclude that the state athletic as­
sociation violated Title IX because spring, the season for girls' golf for 
most of the state, was disadvantageous compared to the fall when boys' 
golf was played. 196 The court found that, "In Michigan, the golf courses 
are in better condition during the fall season. Girls are more likely to 
face cold, icy weather and frozen or muddy golf course greens in the 
spring and do not have the advantage of starting the season on a course 
which has been groomed all summer. "197 Moreover, the fact that Michi­
gan golf courses close in the winter (as they do in Massachusetts) means 
that "Michigan girls begin their spring high school season without the 
benefit of playing during the winter and score more poorly" than golfers 
who compete in the fall. 198 Finally, "because the NCAA letter of intent 
signing date is in early November, Michigan boys have four years of golf 
experience and scores on which to be evaluated. Michigan girls only have 
three years because their season occurs after the letter of intent signing 
193 See Rick Rendell, Snow problems wreak havoc on the start of spring sports practice, 
METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.metrowestdailyn­
ews.com/sports/20160321/snow-problems-wreak-havoc-on-start-of-spring-sports-practice 
[https://perma.cc/EH43-SB8R] (describing the impact of late snow on spring sports in Massachu­
setts); Brittney McNamara, Heavy snow and lasting winter weather delay spring sports, WICKED 
LOCAL (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.wickedlocal.com/article/20150307/NEWS/150306939 
[https://perma.cc/XG4L-5DV3] (describing the same problem in another year). 
194 See Thomka, 2007 WL 867084, at *l. Though the court was not asked to decide whether the 
girls' spring season was discriminatory in light of the boys' season in the fall, it did acknowledge 
the disadvantage of golfing in the spring as part of its analysis of the discriminatory effect of Rule 
43.2.1.2. Id. at *5-7. 
195 Id. at *4. 
196 Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 862. 
197 Id. at 832. The district court's findings about golf and its conclusion that the MSHAA discrim­
inated against girls by scheduling it in the spring was later affirmed by the 6th Circuit. Cmtys. for 
Equity, 377 F.3d at 515. 
198 Cmtys. for Equity, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
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date. "199 To be sure, the fact (if proven) that spring is the disadvantageous 
season for golf in Massachusetts would not be conclusive of discrimina­
tion under Title IX and equal protection, but rather would be a component 
in a wider analysis of disadvantageous seasons. That said, there do not 
appear to be any other sports that are scheduled in different seasons for 
boys and girls that have raised these concerns. 200 
Gender-free golf is one solution that would address both the dis­
crimination that results from scheduling the girls' regular season at a 
disadvantageous time of year and the discrimination against female golf­
ers on boys' fall teams whose individual post-season does not occur until 
spring. The MIAA could consolidate all high school golf in the fall or 
continue to have fall and spring seasons from which member schools 
could choose. Either way, limitations on available facilities would not 
create a gender-based disparity. All golfers would be eligible to compete 
for the individual title in the post-season championships that serve as 
capstones to the regular season. 
D. 	 Degendered Golf Poses Minimal Risk of Reducing Girls' 
Participation 
For advocates of women's sports and gender equality, the biggest 
risk from degendering any sport is that it would diminish athletic oppor­
tunities for girls. This could happen if girls are deterred by the prospect 
of having to compete with and against boys. It could also happen if girls 
are indeed unable to survive gender-free tryouts because they are, on the 
whole, less competitive at the sport than boys are. Even though Emily 
Nash has proven that female golfers can compete with and win against 
boys, this is a valid and understandable concern, as it is the reason for 
the separate-but-equal approach in the first place.201 Yet, this risk must 
be properly contextualized. As noted above, an overwhelming majority 
of Massachusetts high schools sponsor only a boys' team, which means 
that most schools with golf teams already expect any girls who want to 
compete to surmount any disinterest in playing with or against boys, and 
to earn a position on the team. 202 The remaining minority of schools that 
199 Id. 
200 The fact that most Massachusetts sports that are organized separately for girls and boys are 
generally scheduled to the same season limits the potential for a wider analysis involving additional 
examples of disadvantageous scheduling of seasons. Girls' volleyball is a fall sport and boys' vol­
leyball is a spring sport, yet both of these seasons coincide with the traditional and collegiate seasons 
for their respective sports. As such, it is unlikely that volleyball scheduling would provide any 
evidence of disadvantageous scheduling affecting boys to offset the disadvantageous scheduling of 
girls' golf. 
201 See supra note 167; Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d at 295. 
202 MlAA PARTICIPATION SURVEY, supra note 155. 
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offer teams for girls do so in the spring season.203 Because gender-free 
golf could be played in the fall, it would remove the practical disad­
vantages that female golfers on girls' teams must overcome, as well as 
the stigmatizing impact of imposing these disadvantages on female rather 
than male golfers. The degendering of golf could have a net positive 
effect on girls' participation, based on these considerations alone. 
In addition, however, there are two attributes of golf when played 
as a team sport that, if exploited, could make it particularly accommo­
dating of female golfers on gender-free teams. One feature of team golf 
is that, unlike other team sports, there is no inherently ideal roster size. 
Other team sports have a set number of players who can compete at a 
time-nine in baseball, six in hockey, for example. While this number 
does not cap the size of the team, it serves to anchor what is generally 
considered an appropriate number. Rosters in those sports are therefore 
relatively similar in size from school to school. In team golf, however, 
there is great diversity in the size of teams throughout the Common­
wealth. The fact that some schools have golf teams of twenty, suggests 
that schools with teams of only four or five could probably expand in 
size to accommodate more players without diminishing the opportunities 
of existing players. 204 Such expansion would mean that degendering golf 
doesn't necessarily require all female golfers to displace an existing male 
golfer in order to make the team. 
The second feature of team golf that could make it more accommo­
dating of female golfers is that there is no paradigmatic format for team 
golf. Unlike baseball, for example, which is consistently played the same 
way, team golf is played in a variety of ways already, even within the 
Commonwealth. While it would be impossible to imagine changes to the 
rules of baseball that would maximize participation by athletes whose 
skills are not already selected for by the rules of the game-such changes 
would undermine essential aspects of the sport-team golf is not so re­
stricted by such consistency and tradition. 205 Organizers therefore have 
more leeway in team golf than in other sports to consider changes to the 
format and the scoring that could maximize participation by golfers with 
a diverse set of skills and abilities. 
203 Rule 35 .1.1 of the MIAA HANDBOOK states that "[a] school may offer golf in either Fall or 
Spring, but the Boys Team Tournament is held in the Fall and the Girls Team Tournament is held 
in the Spring." MIAA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 36. 
204 For instance, Agawam High School has eighteen boys and three girls playing golf, Amesbury 
High School has eighteen boys playing golf, and Bellingham High School has twenty-one boys and 
one girl playing golf. MASS. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2018-19 SPORTS PARTICIPATION 
BY SCHOOL 4-5, 17 (May 10, 2019), http://www.miaa.net/gen/miaa generated bin/docu­
ments/basic_ module/MemberSchoo!Participation20182019. pdf [https: //perma:-cc/L9WY-957K]. 
205 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (holding that permitting a golfer to 
use a golf cart-despite the association's walking requirement-"would not fundamentally alter the 
nature of petitioner's tournaments."). 
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Individual golf, to be sure, has traditionally and is consistently 
played in the same way: "using clubs to cause a ball to progress from the 
teeing ground to a hole some distance away with as few strokes as pos­
sible. "206 An individual golfer therefore needs a combination of skills: 
strength to drive the ball from the tee to the green and the finesse to put 
the green. Some of the formats for team golf are inherently based on 
stroke play, so that a round of golf played by all members of both teams 
can simultaneously determine a team winner and an individual winner. 
For example, sometimes teams square off in matched pairs and the team 
with the highest number of pair-wins is the match winner. In another 
team format, after all players on both teams have played the entire 
course, the team is awarded one point for having the player with the 
lowest score on the first nine holes, one point for having the player with 
the lowest score on the last nine holes, and one point for having the player 
with the lowest score overall; the team with the highest number of points 
wins the match. 
With so much inherent diversity already in the sport of team golf, 
rules of team play could creatively seek to recognize a wider range of 
skills that might be present on an all-gender team. For example, after all 
players on both teams have played all 18 holes, the team winner could 
be determined by series of points awarded for the player who uses the 
fewest strokes to reach the green from the tee, the player who uses the 
fewest strokes from the green to the hole, and the player with the lowest 
score overall. This is only a slight modification from the team golf format 
that awards one point for each of the front-nine winner, back-nine win­
ner, and overall winner. But it would permit a player with less physical 
strength, who might need two strokes to reach the green, a chance to 
contribute to the team's overall score of the match. A good short-game 
player would therefore be more valuable to the roster even if they don't 
drive the ball as far as the other players on the team. A coach putting 
together a team would take this into account when deciding who can play, 
with the result being a more physically-diverse team that naturally is 
more gender diverse as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
On its face, Attorney General v. MIAA secures a limited right of 
boys to play on girls' teams. 207 But more fundamentally, it is a decision 
that rejects the knee-jerk unqualified protectionism that justifies the seg­
regation of sports by sex. Arguably, it is a case that should have inspired 
206 Id. at 683. 
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more creative alternatives to segregation than it has in fact. On the occa­
sion of the decision's fortieth anniversary, it makes sense to reconsider 
the paradigm of segregation in sport. 
This article contributes a modest and practical proposal that accepts 
the invitation extended by the Supreme Judicial Court forty years ago to 
ensure that segregation is tailored as narrowly as possible to secure pro­
tection of girls' athletic opportunities. Without abandoning segregation 
altogether, it is possible to start to examine it critically and seek to scale 
it back where possible. Golf represents one concrete example of a sport 
in which girls may have more to gain than lose by removing the segre­
gation in that sport. More fundamentally, the process of examination that 
is reflected in Part IV can serve as a model for continuing to examine all 
sports over time. 
Gender-free sports, whether golf or something else, are important 
to include among the options for high school athletes for three important 
reasons: first, they mitigate the stigma inherent in the protectionisms that 
female athletes are categorically inferior. Emily Nash prevailed with the 
lowest score in the boys' tournament and without any accommodation. 
But it was only because her school decided to only field a boys' golf team 
that she was competing in the fall tournament against male competitors. 208 
There could be more people like Emily Nash out there; we just don't see 
them because the majority of female golfers compete separately, in the 
spring, and only against each other. Gender-free golf would provide 
more opportunities for female athletes, their male teammates, and society 
at large to recognize female athleticism as athleticism, unqualified. Sec­
ond, gender-free sports can equalize access to resources, such as in the 
case of golf: it is difficult for high schools to find golf courses to schedule 
practice and competitions for separate teams in the same season, and girls 
are relegated to the less advantageous spring season. Unification of two 
separate teams would have the practical benefit of equalizing access to 
resources at the most advantageous time. Finally, gender-free golf would 
provide more opportunities for athletes to participate without scrutiny of 
their sex and gender. This could be particularly advantageous to athletes 
who are trans gender, including those who are non-binary. Trans gender 
athletes, especially transgender female athletes, often face public scrutiny 
and criticism when participating in girls' sports. 209 Gender-free options 
provide transgender athletes the opportunity to avoid this risk while still 
participating in athletics. Athletes who identify as other than male or fe­
male may also face similar scrutiny when participating in gendered 
sports. In addition, however, whereas other transgender athletes have the 
opportunity to select gendered sports that validate their gender identities, 
a non-binary athlete's opportunity for gender-validating participation is 
208 Auclair, supra note 171. 

209 See generally Barnes, supra note 144. 
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currently limited but would be enhanced by the addition of more gender­
free opportunities. 
For all these reasons, educators in Massachusetts should adhere to 
the forty-year old directive in Attorney General v. MIAA to ensure that 
segregation is narrowly tailored to its protectionist objective and should 
strive to degender sports wherever it makes sense to do so. 
